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THE EROTICS OF TORTS

Carol Sanger*

FEMINIST AccusED

OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT. By Jane Gallop.
Durham, N.C.
: Duke University Press, Public Planet Books. 1 9 97.
Pp.101. $9.95.

I.
"What kind of feminist would be accused of sexual harass
ment?" asks Jane Gallop (p.1). Gallop quickly provides her own
challenging answer: "the sort of feminist ...that ...do[es] not
respect the line between the intellectual and the sexual" (p. 12).
Gallop is firm and unrepentant about not respecting this line: "I
sexualize the atmosphere in which I work. When sexual harassment
is defined as the introduction of sex into professional relations, it
becomes quite possible to be both a feminist and a sexual harasser"
(p.11). Figuring out what this means - and what its implications
are for professors, for feminists, for law schools - is the task I've
set for this review. I begin with a warning. As Margot Channing
suggested some forty years ago, "Fasten your seat belts. It's going
to be a bumpy night."1
The atmosphere that Gallop sexualizes is the Department of
English and Comparative Literature at the University of Wisconsin
at Milwaukee, where Gallop, "one of the ornaments of the post
structuralist school,"2 is a Distinguished Professor. Her best known
books, Thinking Through the Body and The Daughter's Seduction,
offer close readings of Sade, Freud, Lacan, Cixous, and Irigaray at
the intersection of feminism and psychoanalysis.3 Feminist Accused
of Sexual Harassment seems an altogether different kind of project.
It offers a close reading of one woman, Jane Gallop herself, as the
subject of sexual harassment complaints brought by two graduate
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. B.A. 1970, Wellesley; J.D. 1976, Michigan.
- Ed. I would like to thank Ed Baker, Carol Chomsky, Jane Ginsburg, Florence Keller,
Eben Moglen, and Jeremy Waldron for their suggestions and Pam Scheininger, Columbia
Law School, 1998, for excellent research assistance. I also thank participants at faculty work
shops at the University of Minnesota Law School, the University of Iowa College of Law,
and Columbia Law School for thoughtful and good-natured comments.
1. ALL ABOUT EVE {20th Century Fox 1950).
2. Janet Malcolm, It Happened in Milwaukee, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Oct. 23, 1997, at 8.
3. JANE GALLOP, THINKING THROUGH THE BODY {1988); JANE GALLOP, THE DAUGH·
TER's SEDUCIJON: FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS {1982); other books include READING
LACAN {1985); PEDAGOGY: THE QUESTION OF IMPERSONATION {1995); and AROUND 1981:
ACADEMIC FEMINIST LITERARY THEORY {1992) [hereinafter GALLOP, AROUND 1981].
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students after she kissed one of them in public. Feminist Accused
- and Acquitted, although this outcome doesn't make its way to
the title - is Gallop's effort to tell her story so that, as she puts it,
everyone can "understand what's going o n with sexual
harassment."4
What's going on, according to Gallop, is doctrine gone haywire.
No longer is sexual harassment concerned with brutish male bosses
demanding sex from female subordinates in exchange for job secur
ity. Sexual harassment has moved from explicit demands and
threats to "charged talk or behavior; implicit professional threats
[that] could possibly cover the entire range of professional interac
tion" (p. 8). In addition to the potentially "limitless" possibilities in
form, the cast of players has also increased (p. 8). "Harassment
need not be perpetrated by bosses; peers can harass, even subordi
nates. And gender can be a variable: increasing numbers of cases
involve a man claiming to have been harassed or a woman accused
of harassment" (p. 8). Indeed, as things stand now, even a feminist
can be accused, and even when the underlying relationship was
heartily consensual.
This, for Gallop, is the most troubling aspect of what is going on:
the inclusion of consensual sexual or amorous relationships be
tween teachers and students within general harassment policies and
prohibitions. Feminist Accused takes aim at this "bloated ...ram
pant expansion" (p. 8) and argues that sexual harassment as now
conceptualized and applied in schools is stupid, regressive, and fatal
both for sex and for the production of knowledge. Gallop argues
that sexual harassment law and policy should have nothing to do
with consensual relations between professors and graduate stu
dents, for two reasons. First, law should play no part in incapacitat
ing adult women by refusing yet again to recognize their desire for
and ability to consent to sex. As she explains in a critique familiar
to feminists, "Denying women the right to consent reinforces our
status as objects rather than desiring subjects" (p.38). Policies that
deem all sex with professors sexual harassment are based on the
protective assumption that "women do not know what we want,
that someone else, in a position of greater knowledge and power,
knows better" (pp. 38-39). Gallop's position is that adult women,
even young adult women students, know and should be able to act
on what they want.
4. P. 7. FEMINIST AccusED is part of the new Public Planet Books series published by
Duke University Press. The series aspires to "provide a running narrative of our societies at
this particular fin de siecle." Dilip Gaon Kar & Michael Warner, Introduction to Public
Planet Book Series, appearing in JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST AccusED OF SEXUAL HARASS
MENT (1997). It attempts "to open the scholarly discourse on contemporary public culture
and to illuminate that discourse with the kinds of narrative that will challenge sophisti
cated readers, make them think, and especially make them question." Id.
.

.

•

1854

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1852

Her second argument, perhaps less familiar to those who attend
the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
rather than that of the Modem Language Association, is that teach
ing is at core an erotic enterprise. Intense, amorous, even sexual
relations between professors and students lie at the heart of what
good teaching is about - the production and acquisition of knowl
edge. The argument comes in varying strengths. Consider this mid
level version: "Whether it is perceived as an instrument of domi
nance or a mode of revelation, the educational process involves an
emotionally suffused link between human beings. Its intimacies
form a tangled web of intellectual aspiration and erotic desire."5
More simply, "learning and teaching are acts of desire and pas
sion."6 Gallop, however, endorses a stronger version, one that
more or less goes the full Monty. Good professors should have stu
dents eager to sleep with them and there is nothing wrong in em
powering those students intellectually and sexually by taking them
up on their offers (p. 12). She speaks as one who was so empow
ered7 and who has subsequently also empowered a number of her
students.8
This may not be quite the way law professors are used to talking
or thinking about what it is we do for a living. It may come as a
surprise to some to learn that we have all along been teaching una
wares in some primordial sexual soup.9 Yet there is probably little
disagreement about a weak version of academic erotics: the propo
sition that teaching involves passion. The erotics of pedagogy takes
this comfortable, often noble, idea off its familiar hinge and accepts
5. Regina Barreca & Deborah Denenholz, Preface to THE EROTICS OF INSTRUCTION at
(Regina Barreca & Deborah Denenholz Morse eds., 1997).
6. Id. at viii.
7. "I learned and excelled; I desired and I fucked my teachers." P. 42.
8. Although Gallop and her plaintiff students were all women, the discussion here is not
limited to same-sex faculty-student relations, as Gallop herself has not, in practice, and per
haps in theory, so limited herself. Consensual relations are, without question, complicated by
the sexual identities of the various players - boy-girl, gay-lesbian-straight, etc. Gallop's the
orizing derives from her own case - an initially insecure young woman empowered by femi
nism and sex with big-deal men. Yet other combinations of traits among the players may
produce other results. For example, does Gallop's bravado have the same radical appeal if
we give her lines to a male professor? Does involvement with women professors similarly
increase the mind-body confidence of young male students, or are we suddenly in Tea and
Sympathy territory? It may be that because all students have Jess power within the institu
tion than their professors, they may be equally eligible for empowerment - or whatever as a consequence of sleeping with their professors. On the other hand, the dynamic of why
students fall for teachers or how officials enforce relationship policies may differ depending
on everyone's respective sexualities. As this Review progresses, I will take account of these
various distinctions when they seem to matter.
9. Indeed, it has been suggested that the phrase "sexual academic" is an oxymoron, like
"jumbo shrimp" or "Greater Cleveland." See Regina Barreca, Contraband Appetites, in THE
EROTICS oF !NSTRucnoN, supra note 5, at 1, 4. On the other hand, some contend that the
phrase is not oxymoronic but redundant, like "working mother" or "dysfunctional family."
See id. at 4.
vii
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that passion is not always limited to the subject of instruction - a
passion for poetry, a passion for procedure - but at times directs
itself toward the object of instruction, the student. There is some
thing to this, at least at an empirical level, for we all know col
leagues who have courted or married former students. Thus the lag
for law professors may not be in behaving so very differently from
those in other departments, just in failing to theorize about it. This
is not to ignore our own stylized framing of the issue in legalistic
terms: academic freedom, rights of association, fiduciary relation
ships, and so on. But while law schools may not be quite the
hothouses of English departments, where ardor, as opposed to, say,
nuisance, can be the very subject of instruction, there is surely
enough consensual interaction going on in the legal academy to
make it worth considering how Gallop's arguments about faculty
student sex and the underlying erotics of pedagogy apply to us.
II.

Feminist Accused is a great piece of performance scholarship.
That is because Gallop makes her case against sexual harassment
through the steamy specifics of the case against her. That case may
have been based on only one public kiss and one public comment,
but what a kiss! What a comment! (And what suspense! We get
neither kiss nor comment until the book's final pages.) Thus in
Feminist Accused performance and scholarship unfold together.
This is very much part of Gallop's point: "It is no more possible to
really teach without at times eliciting powerful and troubling sensa
tions than it is to write powerfully without at times producing the
same sort of sensations" (p. 100). (We will return later to the topic
of what one chooses to do with the sensations elicited.) Sensations
abound in Feminist Accused and in its readers, as the author, com
bining the talents of stand-up Sandra Bernhardt and sit-down
Spalding Gray, performs her argument in print.

Gallop is constantly, vibrantly aware of both being and creating
spectacle - in the classroom, at conferences, on the page. She well
understands that "[f]or spectacle to speak, it must be analyzed, bro
ken down into its various components" (pp. 6-7). Feminist Accused
is therefore presented in four chunks, sketched here in brief. The
first, Feminist Accuser}, of Sexual Harassment, is mostly biographi
cal. It details how Gallop became a feminist and the intellectual
and sexual significance for her of that transformation.
Chapter Two, Consensual Amorous Relations, describes how
Gallop's biographical truths were transformed into pedagogical
ones.
Central to my commitment as a feminist teacher is the wish to trans

mit the experience that brought me as a young woman out of roman-
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tic paralysis and into the power of desire and knowledge, to bring the
women I teach to their own power, to ignite them as feminism ignited
me when I was a student. [p. 12]
Offering up her own amorous - and amorous plus - relations
with teachers and students as Exhibit A in defense of unregulated
consensual relations, she argues that nothing less than knowledge
itself is now at stake: if universities prohibit "not only sex but 'amo
rous relations' between teacher and student, the 'consensual amo
rous relation' that will be banned from our campuses might just be
teaching itself" (p. 57).
In Chapter Three, Object of Intellectual Inquiry, Gallop extends
this claim and argues that more than just direct student-teacher in
teraction is risked by over-ambitious harassment policies. That is,
not only sex, but scholarship on sex is under attack. The basis of
this somewhat self-indulgent but provocative chapter is again bio
graphical. Gallop had been planning a conference on teacher-stu
dent sex. When some feminist faculty objected, the original plan
was scrapped in frustration and "Pedagogy: The Question of the
Personal" was substituted.1 0 Even this less heated subject drew fire
from so-called feminist faculty, including the university affirmative
action officer at whom Gallop yelled "fuck you" in frustration.
Feminist students later picketed the conference and handed out
bumper stickers reading "Distinguished Professors Do It Pedagogi
cally" (p. 68).
Gallop's point here is that not only engaged teaching but schol
arship itself falls under the threatening shadow of university an
tiharassment policies. Indeed, she notes that the students who filed
the complaint specifically sought the suppression of her scholarship
by asking the university to find that "making the complaint the sub
ject of intellectual inquiry constitutes retaliation" (p. 78). Of
course, the university did not do so, and Gallop has indeed made
the episode the subject of scholarly inquiry. Feminist Accused thus
stands as a more scholarly version of her earlier retort to the uni
versity affirmative action officer.
Finally, we come to Chapter Four, the long-awaited hard copy,
We get the steamy details of
the kiss ("[Professor Gallop] mashed her lips against mine and
shoved her tongue in my mouth"), the comment ("[G]raduate stu
dents are my sexual preference[!]"), and the conference at which
both occurred (the First Annual Graduate Student Gay and Les
bian Conference, "a conference that was sexier than most").11

Professor Accused ofKissing Students.

10. The conference papers are collected in PEDAGOGY: THE QUESTION OF lMPERSONA·
TION (Jane Gallop ed., 1995).
11. P. 84. In a section of the book one might not want to leave lying open around the
house, Gallop notes that conferences are not just intellectually professional events, but "pro
foundly social" and "also inevitably sexy. It is not unco=on for scholars to have affairs
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More importantly, Chapter Four brings Gallop's argument full cir
cle, as Feminist Accused concludes as it began, setting out the inti
mate connection between spectacle and' scholarship, sex and
intellect. Here is the summation:

When I said that graduate students were my sexual preference,
when I kissed my advisee in a bar for all to see, I was making a specta
cle of myself....
. . . The spectacle was meant to shock and to entertain, and to
make people think.
I gave this book a tabloid title because I wanted, again, to make a
spectacle of myself .. .
...to produce a sensation. Not the hollow kind where sensation is
achieved at the expense of thought. But the best kind, where knowl
edge and pleasure, sex and thought play off and enhance each other.
When I kissed my student ...I was trying to produce just such a
spectacle. But I failed to make myself understood.
By writing this book, I thought I'd give it another shot. [pp.10001]
Thus the question: Does Feminist Accused succeed where femi
nist accused believes herself to have failed? In this second, printed
performance, has Gallop made herself understood? My short an
swer is yes, she has. It is impossible not to grasp her message, her
method, and the relation between the two. At the same time, mak
ing one's case understood is not the same thing as prevailing. That
is, an argument can be both conceptually clear and substantively
wrong, or at least incomplete, in ways that I shall argue ought to
matter in considering policy.
On certain relatively minor factual matters, Gallop is just plain
wrong. These are easily identified, quickly fixed and, I think, not
really crucial to her case, however useful they may be to the drama
of her argument. For example, sexual harassment is not a criminal
act (pp. 6, 27, etc.). On other matters, Gallop is not wrong, but
disingenuous (or astonishingly naive and this seems impossible ).
The infamous public kiss is a good example. Gallop describes the
kiss as "a performance. By that, I do not mean that I wasn't really
kissing her or that I didn't find it sexy. What I mean is that ...we
kissed like that because we knew we were being watched. And it
was precisely the knowledge of being watched that made it sexy."12
during conferences, even more co=on to engage in flirtations. . . . A good conference is
likely to be an eroticized workplace." Pp. 82-83.
12. P. 91. Publicity has an erotic flip side. Consider the pleasure of the covert: "The
door opened quickly and an attractive young female in tight washed jeans and a cotton
sweater slid elegantly through it and sort of glided along the wall to the third row, where she
deftly maneuvered between the crowded seats . . . . [Law professor] Callahan was ignoring
this entry. . . . Darby Shaw [picture Julia Roberts] was not afraid of him, and for a split
second he wondered if anyone knew he was sleeping with her. Probably not." JoHN
GRISHAM, THE PELICAN BRIEF 12 (1992).
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I think the description conveys the moment rather nicely. But Gal
lop loses ground when two pages later she snickers at the idea that
this kiss, which "lasted no more than a minute and didn't go below
the neck[] could actually function as 'proof of harassment" (p.93).
Such geographical distinctions form the basis of Gallop's insistence
that her relations with students are amorous and sexy but not sex
ual and therefore outside sexual harassment. We have had too
much national quibbling lately about what intimate behavior counts
as "sex" for Gallop to take refuge in this kind of definitional
thicket. Consensual relations may not be harassment but it is not
because they involve necking instead of intercourse.
But on the stuff that really matters - a sustained if sensational
inquiry into the project of teaching and what we devote ourselves to
as academics - Gallop's clarity is important, provocative and
worth our time. Putting aside for the moment images of a tongue
down some graduate student's throat - and acknowledging that
much of Gallop's point is that we cannot put the image aside Gallop provides case and occasion to think hard about the compli
cated, anxiety-producing subject of consensual relationships in the
academy and the companion issue of passion and pedagogy. Her
contribution is certainly timely, as the meanings of consensual rela
tions off-campus have lodged themselves more vividly in the coun
try's consciousness and as universities now hammer out policies to
govern and guide members of the academic cominunity as they fool
around and fall in love with one another.
But more provocative than its timing is its content, for Gallop's
contribution turns the debates, as usually rehearsed, on their heads.
The structure of the traditional argument is this: Everyone agrees
as a starting point that adult women have full contractual capacity.
In the academic context, however, the consent of adult women stu
dents to sex with professors is understood as a more fragile proposi
tion, increasingly qualified in school harassment policies by
adjectives like "apparent" or "alleged." Administrators are con
cerned that student consent may be something less than fully volun
tary for a number of persuasive reasons: the immense and
intractable power disparity between professor and student; the psy
choanalytic problem of transference; and the fiduciary-like relation
between professor and student that precludes arms-length deal
ing.13 Other bases of opposition to consensual relations include the
appearance, if not the fact, of favoritism. Students not romantically
involved with their professors may worry about what difference that
fact will make. In the special case of law students, policies against
consensual relations are seen as an introduction to a model concep13. These arguments are forcefully set out in Caroline Forell's What's Wrong with
Faculty-Student Sex: The Law School Context, 41 J. LEOAL Eouc. 47 {1997).
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tion of professional conduct.14 A number of universities have en
dorsed these concerns and now forbid or discourage consensual
relationships between students and faculty when the professor is in
any kind of supervisory role with regard to the student.15
Gallop buys none of this. She agrees that there is something
special about the educational setting. But what's special, she says,
is that it makes consent more sensible, not more suspect. The acad
emy is exactly the place where amorous relations should :flourish
and for reasons directly connected to the educational project. She
not only assumes the validity of student consent, but argues that
sleeping with a teacher may well be a sign of a student making the
most of her education. "Lots of other smart, ambitious young
women, many of them likewise feminist academics today, have felt
powerful because they seduced their teachers."16

In the end, I remain unpersuaded that a headlong dive into sex
ual relations with professors is necessarily the smart student's ticket
to personal or intellectual power. I am dissuaded from the view less
by Gallop's theorizing than by her evidence - that is, Gallop's own
case, a sample of one.17 I do not doubt her story of success and
pleasure, or the more general proposition that there is something
thrilling in moments of connection with students that spark some
thing below the brain. Yet Gallop's story is not every student's, and
that distinction matters.18 In this review, I want to focus on two
14. See id. at 69.
15. See sources cited infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
16. P. 43. Gallop explains that students are empowered in part by having their consent
respected. This reminds me of the old Elaine May and Mike Nichols routine where the reluc
tant teenage girl asks her boyfriend if he will respect her the next day. "Will I respect you?
Oh boy, how I will respect you! I will respect you SO much!"
17. Evaluating Gallop's claims without trashing her practices has been a challenge in re
viewing the book. Her method raises questions about abstraction and particularity in the
context of sexual harassment.
18. Using one's own story as the basis for policy proposal is tricky business, especially
when the story is thrilled with its own sensationalism. Gallop has argued that what she calls a
"limit case," that is, an extraordinary set of facts, is specially valuable for theorizing. P. 7.
Legal scholars are also thinking hard about the role of the snappy story, or anecdote, in law.
Susan Bandes, for example, has recently undertaken a valuable study of the anecdote in
criminal law. See Susan Bandes, Narrative Coherence and the Anecdotal Tum: Stories of
Police Brutality (on file with author). And it is through a criminal law anecdote that I want to
challenge, or at least complicate, Gallop's biographical method. Like Gallop's, the limit case
I put forth involves consensual relations, power disparities, inversion of power, and an insti
tutional setting.
The law story is that of Reginald Powell, a felon convicted of murder and sentenced to
death after being represented at trial by Mary Ann Marxkors. See Lawyer-Client Intimacy
Prompts Death Row Plea, N.Y. TIMES,' Feb. 16, 1998, at AS. While preparing for the trial,
Marxkors and Powell became emotionally involved with one another. After the sentence
was imposed, they had sex in a holding cell in the court building; "It became physical when
the judge told me he was going to sentence Reggie to death." Id. Powell appealed his death
sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer's clouded judg
ment. For example, Marxkors had recommended that Powell go to trial instead of pleading
guilty in exchange for a life sentence. Only l�ter did she realize that "there was a great gap in
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ways in which Feminist Accused remains an incomplete account of
consensual relations.19 First, Gallop mostly ignores and certainly
minimizes the possibility of harm to students as a result of their
consensual relationships with professors. Second, Gallop takes a
simplistic view of consent in a complex setting. In what follows, I
want to round out her picture of consent, focusing not just on
whether it is voluntary, but also on whether it is informed and on
exactly what information a student might need. I also return to the
subject of harm, to consider, as Gallop does not, where the risks as
well as the delights of student-faculty interaction reside.
III.
In 1971, Jane Gallop, college sophomore, became a feminist. In
consequence, she was transformed from a poor student with medio
cre grades who cµt classes and played a lot of bridge into an intel
lectual dervish who wrote an honors thesis, read books not assigned
for any course, and set her mind on graduate studies. And that is
only half of what happened. Sounding a little like a detergent com
mercial, Gallop also tells us that "[t]hanks to feminism, not only did
I become a better student, but my sex life improved" (p. 4). She
had her first orgasm, discovered sexual pleasure and desire, and
"walked around ... constantly in heat, energized for political activ
ity and schoolwork" (pp. 4-5). For Gallop, "feminism will always
name the force that freed me to desire and to learn;" feminism is
"that milieu where knowledge and sex bubble together" (p. 6).
Sex and knowledge bubbled up for Gallop as an undergraduate
in a defining moment at an all-women's party following the spectacthe way she saw Mr. Powell and his crime and the way the jury and judge looked at him and
the crime." Id. On February 25, 1998, Powell was executed by lethal injection. Killer Who
Was Lover of Lawyer Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.26, 1998, at A4.
What are state bar associations to make of this story when deliberating consensual rela
tions policies for lawyers and their clients? Lawyers are not barred from sleeping with their
clients in Missouri; Oregon alone prohibits all sexual relations between attorney and client.
See Caroline Porell, Oregon's "Hands Off' Rule: Eth ical and Liability Issues Presented by
Attorney-Client Sexual Contact, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 711 {1993). See generally Linda
Fitts Mischler, Reconciling Rapture, Representation, and Responsibility: An Argument
Against Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 {1996) (arguing
that the attorney's "personal self' should be beyond regulation). Is it unfair to consider the
Powell case because it seems extraordinary? As Bandes points out, a danger of this kind of
narrative is that "it may confuse listeners into believing it is representative [exactly because]
it is so evocative and memorable." Bandes, supra, at 27. Or does it properly emphasize how
high, if rare, the stakes can be when a lawyer scrambles her personal and professional judg
ments about a client? Sleeping with one's client will always be disastrous, and as evidence of
real lives is crucial to the project of law, anecdote provides "a way of testing theory to ensure
it is grounded in reality." Bandes, supra, at 29.
19. For a more complete discussion of Gallop's case itself and the background conditions
regarding harassment at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, see Margaret Talbot, A
Most Dangerous Method: The Pedagogical Problem ofJane Gallop, LINGUA FRANCA, Jan.
Feb. 1994, at 24.
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ular, "carefully staged entrance" (p. 14) of a professor and student.
What marked the moment was not only that the teacher and her
student had presented themselves publicly as a couple, but that the
usually feminine student was dressed in a suit and the feminist
teacher in a dress. Gallop explains that "[i]t was crucial to this fem
inist spectacle that the student was the one wearing men's cloth
ing. . . . Her suit hinted that their connection made it possible for
this student to take on power with the teacher" (p. 15). In these
early days of women's studies and women's liberation, the experi
ence of taking on power with the teacher extended to sites formerly
closed to students, such as academic committees and classrooms,
where working out the fundamentals of early feminist courses was
necessarily a collaborative process.
It extended as well to more private areas, for as Gallop explains,
"[f]eminism provided the occasion to fantasize teacher-student sex
alongside other brave new possibilities" (p. 18). The possibilities crystallized when Gallop hit graduate school and made it a project
to seduce her two thirty-something male dissertation advisors. Af
ter years of her doing her "utmost" to bring about their consent in behavior that sounds remarkably like stalking - they each fi
nally succumbed to what Gallop identifies as casual sex once with
each (p. 41). And the nub of wisdom derived from these
encounters?
These two had enormous power over me . . . . I was bowled over by
their brilliance; they seemed so superior. I wanted to see them naked,
to see them as like other men. Not so as to stop taking them seriously
as intellects (I never did), but so as to feel my own power in relation
to them....
Screwing these guys definitely did not keep me from taking myself
seriously as a student....Seducing them made me feel kind of cocky
and that allowed me to presume I had something to say worth
saying....
. . . I felt that in their eyes I was both a desirable woman and a
serious scholar. [pp.41-43]

In other words, Gallop went the student in the suit one better. In
stead of wearing a suit to demonstrate the power inversion with her
professors, she was the cocky one.
Now comes some questionable logic. Because Gallop was em
powered by being both smart and sexy with her professors - play
ing at their level and leveling them - she believes that this
opportunity should be made available to other students smart and
sexy enough to recognize that seducing the teacher may bring im
provements all around. Indeed, she converts the belief into a prac
tice. Consistent with her pledge to "ignite [students] as feminism
ignited me when I was a student" (p. 12), Gallop sleeps with under-
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graduate men, graduate women, both members of a lesbian couple,
and so on.20 She doesn't assert that everyone catches fire as she did.
On the contrary, "In my experience, the teaching relation remained
essentially the same after sex: the casual students continued not to
care particularly about the teaching; the serious students continued
to take the teaching seriously and to be taken seriously as students
by the teacher."21
The move from biography to pedagogy to harassment policy
proceeds directly. Sexual harassment policies that forbid the very
conduct that enabled Gallop to be Gallop will necessarily prevent
other such students from becoming all that they can be - which to
some extent seems to be junior Gallops.22

IV.
Central to Gallop's entire argument is the fact of consent: "the
question of whether sexual advances are wanted is absolutely cru
cial" (p. 38). The statutory framework here is clear: sexual harass
ment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances and consent negates
unwelcomeness. Policies that punish consensual relations, argues
Gallop, negate consent. She explains that such policies are neces
sarily "based on the assumption that when a student says yes she
really means no. I cannot help but think that this proceeds from the
same logic according to which when a woman says no she really
means yes" (p. 38).
But the matter of consent is somewhat more complicated. In
the context of sexual harassment, yes can mean yes and the sexual
advance can still be unwanted, as the Supreme Court made clear in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.23 Bank employee Michelle Vinson
had consensual intercourse with Sidney Taylor, a bank vice-presi
dent, over a period of years in order to keep her job. But as the
Supreme Court instructed,

the fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a
defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gra
vamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual ad
vances were "unwelcome." ... The correct inquiry is whether
20. Students seem to do their share of igniting. Gallop dedicates her 1992 book, Around
Academic Feminist Literary Theory to "my Students: The bright, hot, hip (young)
women who fire my thoughts, my loins, my prose. I write this to move you, to please, to
shake you." GALLOP, AROUND 1981, supra note 3.
21. P. 49. I will assume that the serious students who didn't sleep with Gallop were also
still taken seriously by the teacher, although a concern or two along these lines in their minds
would not be surprising.
22. Gallop describes the initial allure of the student later kissed in public: "An ambitious
woman with a flair for outrageous performance, she identified with me and thought I'd be
the ideal teacher for her. I responded strongly to her desire for a career like mine." P. 54.
23. 477 U.S.57 (1986).
1981:
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respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual offenses
were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual inter
course was voluntary.24

In other words, while lack of consent is one sign of unwelcomeness,
it is not necessary for unwelcomeness.
Gallop's riposte may be that consensual but unwanted sexual re
lations are not at all what she has described or endorses. That is,
the students with whom Gallop has been sexually involved have
said, meant, and desired their yeses. Sherry Young adds convinc
ingly to the position: "[t]he idea that women cannot acclimate to
the rigors of a professional life has been decisively rejected only
recently. Feminists should not put forth the proposition that
women are unsuited to the rigors of a personal life."25 At the same
time, however, Vinson and the thousands of other cases won and
settled since make clear why consent - not so much with regard to
sex, as Gallop stresses, but in relation to power - is complicated.
Do faculty secretaries really want to pick up their bosses' laundry,
as many agree to do in violation of hard-won rights under union
contracts? Those concerned about consensual sexual relations be
tween faculty and students doubt the integrity of the student yes for
similar structural reasons. Putting aside consent that results from
job-related arm (or grade) twisting, as all would agree to do in clear
coercion cases, there is something about the power imbalance in the
teacher-student relationship which makes us hesitate before giving
consent in that setting its usual force. These arguments are not un
familiar in the ongoing feminist debate about agency versus coer
cion. Consensual relations policies provide another instance where
skepticism and respect regarding women's consent to sex have si
multaneous appeaJ.26
In this essay, however, I want to suggest a different framework
for thinking about the quality ·of consent in the context of teacher
student relations. Let us assume that agency is not abandoned by
virtue of an adult's status as a student; that is, even though we regu
larly treat our students like children, each retains the capacity to
decide whether or not to become an item with his or her teacher.27
24. Vinson, 477 U.S.at 68.
25. Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning Consensual Relationships in
Higher Education, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 269, 302 (1996) (emphasis added).
26. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal The
ory, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777 (1988).
27. Sherry Young's description of her women law students makes the point:
Ranging in age from twenty-two to over sixty ... many of our students come to law
school after careers as nurses, soldiers, teachers, and construction workers....
. . . All are bright, determined, ambitious people who threw what they could into a
car and headed for a strange place to wrestle with the complexity of the law....[T]hose
who contend that such women are no more capable of deciding who to date than chil
dren or mental patients bear a heavy burden of persuasion.
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I do not want to see "desire erased" in Gallop's phrase (p. 43).
There is, however, a second aspect to consent that law regularly
attends to: consent must be not only voluntary, but informed as
well. Information is understood to enhance and secure voluntari
ness. Thus in a variety of transactions the law requires that infor
mation be disclosed before the consenters are bound. Consumers
get financial and remedy disclosures before they buy or lease
things. Birth mothers must receive all kinds of information - on
counseling, on financial support, on revocation - before they may
consent to the adoption of their child.28
And just what information would be useful to the student who
seeks or accepts an amorous relation with her professor? The facts
that might best inform such a decision are rather hard to come by.
How can a student know if the professor really finds her the bright
est mind he has ever come across, is really going to leave his wife, or
will really love the student forever? These are risks all lovers, at
present, have to take on faith.29 As with representations made
prior to marriage, the fact that suitors, their circumstances, or their
intentions are not exactly as the listener was led to believe is rarely
enough to invalidate the initial consent and annul the marriage;
"[t]he law therefore wisely requires that persons who act on repre
sentations or belief in regard to [matters of personal qualities or
character] should bear the consequences which flow from contracts
into which they have voluntarily entered."3°
There is, however, information about the law of sex discrimina
tion that might be useful to have in the back of one's mind. This
information concerns not so much what one might like to know goYoung, supra note 27, at 271-72. While it is true that all graduate students are adults at law, I
note that even Jane Gallop describes herself when a graduate student as being "in my profes
sional [if not chronological] adolescence." GALLOP, THINKING THROUGH THE BooY, supra
note 3, at 42.
28. See TENN. CooE ANN. § 36-1-111(k)(2)(E) (1995) (requiring judge to ask whether
surrendering parent "desires counseling . . . concerning the decision to surrender or give
parental consent ...and if the person has been made aware of any assistance which might be
available to the person should the person decide not to place the child for adoption"); see
also D.C. CooE ANN. § 32-1007(b) (1993). On revocation, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
210, § 2 (West 1997) (stating that consent is valid no sooner than four days after birth).
29. But consider the proposed tort of seduction that applies the elements of intentional
misrepresentation to lies told for the purpose of inducing sexual consent. See Jane Larson,
"Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking
of Seduction, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 374, 453 (1993). The tort provides that "One who fraudu
lently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of induc
ing another to consent to sexual relations in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other
in deceit for serious physical, pecuniary, and emotional loss caused to the recipient by his or
her justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation." Id.
30. Reynolds v.Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605, 607 (1862). The traditional view has
been that any misrepresentations made before the marriage must go to the "essentials" of
marriage; thus "error or disappointment in personal qualities" were not enough. Reynolds,
85 Mass. (3 Allen) at 607. See also Johnston v. Johnston, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 253 (1993) (hus
band has turned from "prince to frog").
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ing into the relationship, but rather what can happen (so far as the
law is concerned) after the dance is over - for as with other per
sonal relationships, consensual relationships between teachers and
students also end.3 1 The finale can be welcomed, it can be inconse
quential, or it can difficult. Even William Kerrigan - consenting
professor ad infinitum et nauseam - concedes that "[l]ike all
human relationships, [student-teacher relations] are fl.awed and
sometimes tragic. There is usually this initial idealism - the
teacher presents ideas in a beautiful form, and so there is this ele
ment of seduction in pedagogy. And then things come down to
earth, and there often follows disappointment and, on the part of
the student, anger."3 2 Whether angry or not, if the end is not so
devastating that the student never sets foot in the chemistry depart
ment again, what she will most want to do is simply get on with her
course or program, her degree or dissertation.
Sometimes, however, the forward motion of the former lover is
blocked. Among the professorial promises made or implied during
the relationship is what we might call the hedge-betting honesty
pledge. It goes something like, "Whatever happens to our love,our
intellectual connection will always remain," or "Our relationship
may be doomed, but be confident that your bright career is not."3 3
Honest when uttered, perhaps - but there may be newly discov
ered discomfort in having the student around in quite the same
proximity as he or she once was. And what does the law of sexual
harassment have to say about cases in which the consensual lover
with the greater institutional power has the consensual lover with
less transferred, demoted, or fired?
The leading case is Huebschen v. Department of Health and So
During the spring of 1979, David Huebschen, a pro
bationary employee in the Department, developed a close
friendship with his supervisor, Jacquelyn Rader. Although the
friendship blossomed into romance and a brief liaison in a motel,by
November the bloom was gone; indeed, "after Rader had made a

cial Services.34

31. Indeed, the end may come so soon after the beginning that it may be extravagant to
call the connection a relationship.
32. Colloquy, New Rules About Sex on Campus, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1993, at 33, 36
[hereinafter New Rules Colloquy] (remarks of William Kerrigan).
33. A more formal version of this vow is now apparently included in "Consensual Rela
tion Agreements" offered to consensually involved employee couples by a number of compa
nies. See Tom Kuntz, For Water Cooler Paramours, The Ties That (Legally) Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, (Week in Review), at 7. The written representation states: "I want to
assure you that under no circumstances will I allow our relationship or, should it happen, the
end of our relationship, to impact on your job or our working relationship." Id. This is then
affirmed in writing by the "object of affection." Id. The clause is intended to convert the
promisor's assurance into an enforceable obligation of sorts so that demoting one's beloved
now becomes an actionable breach of the agreement for which a particular grievance proce
dure is available.
34. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
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sexually insulting remark to him, Huebschen told her that 'this sex
ual stuff just ha[s] to stop' and that he just wanted to be a friend. "35
Rader soon informed Huebschen that there were problems with his
job performance and by the end of the year, on Rader's recommen
dation, his probation was terminated. Huebschen sued, claiming
that this was sexual harassment under Title VII and sex discrimina
tion under the Equal Protection Clause.
While the Title VII action crumbled because Rader was not an
employer within the meaning of the statute, the sex discrimination
claim failed for reasons of greater interest to us here. Reviewing
the basic law, the court noted that the plaintiff "must show inten
tional discrimination against him because of his membership in a
particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an indi
vidual."36 This he failed to do. While there was no question that
Rader acted spitefully, what mattered was her motivation for spite.
And that, said the court, was not triggered by Huebschen being a
man, but rather being "a former lover who had jilted her."37 Ac
cordingly, "the proper classification, if there was one at all, was the
group of persons with whom Rader had or sought to have a roman
tic affair,'? a group unprotected by the Equal Protection Clause.38

Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School District 8639 elabo
rated on the Huebschen court's analysis. In that case a male princi
pal, Dr. Miller, had a four-year consensual sexual relationship with
the female Director of Special Services, Ms. Keppler. After they
had broken up, Dr. Miller twice asked Ms. Keppler to have sex with
him and each time she refused. Within a few months, he informed
her that "she had lost professional credibility in his eyes, and that as
far as he was concerned she should leave the district."40 By 1988,
Keppler had been demoted to a plain special education teacher.
She then sued the school district for sexual harassment and discrim
ination. Or, as the court restated in its opening paragraph, she "al
leges [those causes of action] but what she really wants is to make
others pay for her mistakes. She will not succeed here."41
The reason for her failure is the prior consensual relationship
with her boss. In setting up its decision, the court distinguished be
tween two kinds of quid pro quo actions: those where the employer
makes his offer or threat clear - "sleep with me and you get a
raise" - and those where the employer simply asks for sex, doesn't
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1169.
Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1171.
Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172.
Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1172.
715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. ill. 1989).
Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 865.
Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 864.
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get it, and then, in the absence of a prior threat "fires, or demotes
the employee, or just makes life miserable, but without further sex
ual advances or innuendos."42 This latter category, the court notes,
are not really cases of quid pro quo but of "sexual retaliation." In
the absence of a prior sexual relation, the difference doesn't matter
so very much because "both amount to sexual discrimination. "43
The existence of a consensual relationship, however, dooms the
plaintiff's claim of discrimination based on sex. That is because "an
employer who seeks retribution because his former lover has jilted
him may be reacting not to the rejection of copulation per se, but to
the change in the status quo - that is, the termination of the inti
mate physical and emotional relationship."44 The court acknowl
edged that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace,
but concluded that
[a]n employee who chooses to become involved in an intimate affair
with her employer ...removes an element of her employment rela
tionship from the workplace, and in the realm of private affairs peo
ple do have the right to react to rejection, jealousy and other
emotions which Title VII says have no place in the employment
setting....
...[That employee] cannot then expect that her employer will feel
the same as he did about her before and during their private relation
ship. Feelings will be hurt, egos damaged or bruised. The conse
quences are the result not of sexual discrimination, but of responses
to an individual because of her former intimate place in her em
ployer's life.45

The only way the plaintiff could rebut the presumption - created
by the existence of the former consensual relationship - that she
was penalized because she was a former lover and not because she
was a woman, would be to show that Dr. Miller had "threatened
punishment if copulation or some form of erotic engagement was
refused."46
A third case further underscores the predicament of a plaintiff
punished on the job as a result of the wounded feelings of a former
lover. In Campbell v. Masten, 47 Susan Campbell, a research biolo
gist, was fired from her job after her boss heard critical comments
about her from Jeffrey Masten, a co-worker with whom she had had
an affair. Campbell argued that Masten wanted her off the prem
ises because he took her very presence at work as a threat to his
new marriage. Aware of the earlier cases, Campbell argued that
42. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 868.
43. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 868.
44. Keppler, 715 F. Supp.at 868.
45. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
46. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869.
47. 955 F. Supp. 526 (D. Md.1997).
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her termination was clearly based on her sex: Masten would not
have initiated an affair with her "but for her gender as a female. "48
The court refused to buy this link to sex discrimination. It agreed
that Masten's affair with and subsequent antipathy toward Camp
bell were "premised on the underlying fact that Campbell is a
woman, given his apparent heterosexuality. " 49 Nonetheless,
Masten's behavior was based on personal animosity toward his former lover based on that relational status, not her sex. "In the ab
sence of such a distinction, " warned the court, "any workplace
affected by consensual workplace romances gone sour, and the con
comitant workplace politics, could spawn Title VII claims. " 50 The
court then gave a sobering glimpse into permissible workplace poli
tics, noting that while

Masten's criticism of Campbell's work after their relationship ended
. . . may have detrimentally affected [her boss's opinion of her], it is
harOiy uncommon for a friend to demonstrate loyalty through a show
ing of allegiance and support after [a] friend ends a romantic relation
ship with another. While such behavior may cause divisiveness
among co-workers as a result of blurring the line between one's pri
vate life and one's workplace, it does not add up to, or even approach,
sex discrimination.51
One can easily imagine the workings of such shows of allegiance
among colleagues in the academy, where committees award or re
new student fellowships, draft departmental recommendations, ap
point graduate students as TAs, urge appointments, and so on.5 2 As
48. Campbell, 955 F. Supp. at 528.
49. Campbell, 955 F. Supp. at 528.
50. Campbell, 955 F. Supp. at 528.
51. Campbell, 955 F. Supp. at 529. Retaliation is also unactionable when directed against
an employee for uncovering a secret consensual relationship, see Ellert v. University of Texas,
at Dallas 52 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (secretary fired after discovering Dean in embrace
with his assistant; no su=ary judgment for plaintiff; "[e]ven if [secretary's] knowledge of
the affair was the true animus behind the discharge decision, it was a motivation that did not
rely upon her gender and, as such, it was not within the ambit of Title VIl's protections"), or
when directed against a third party disliked by one party to the consensual relationship, see
Polk v. Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (woman employee fired by male supervi
sor at request of another woman employee with whom supervisor was having a sexual
relationship).
52. Retaliation is not always subtle. In the only published case involving a law professor,
George v. Un iversity of Idaho, 822 P.2d 549 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991), the professor mailed
letters to every member of the Idaho state bar advising them that his former lover and stu
dent "was neither competent nor morally fit to practice law," formally opposed her applica
tion to take the bar examination, and sent letters to state newspapers disparaging his
student's character. George, 822 P.2d at 552-53. This awful behavior followed a formal set
tlement agreement between the school, student, and professor based on his earlier "physical
and emotional intimidation [of the student], in and out of the classroom" after their relation
ship ended. George, 822 P.2d at 550. It is worth noting that the settlement agreement had
given the harassing professor an eighteen-month leave of absence with pay and a best efforts
pledge from the university president and law school dean to secure him other employment
"accentuating the positive aspects of his performance at the law school." George, 822 P.2d at
551.

·
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the cases make clear, denying such benefits to one's former lover,
either directly or through the action of loyal friends, does not add
up to sex discrimination. The cases may, however, provide the basis
for some reflection on the part of a would-be student sweetheart.
Where there has been no quid pro quo threat or request after the
consensual relationship has ended, there is simply no relief for
whatever professional vindictiveness follows.s3
Outside the harassment area, the law recognizes that the dy
namics - indeed, the location alone - of particular transactions
can influence the quality of consent. Consider consumer sales in
one's home or directives to physicians signed in nursing homes.
Both are seen, for different reasons, as inherently coercive in ways
that change how the law responds to the transaction. Because we
tend to be polite and submissive toward strangers in our own
homes, the consumer can rescind the contract for the Encyclopedia
Britannica within five days. Because nursing home residents are
highly dependent on those who care for them, their do-not-resusci
tate orders must be regularly renewed and in front of witnesses.
Campuses too may similarly disturb the background conditions nec
essary for a fair deal.
There are, of course, a few problems with disclosure as a correc
tive mechanism for personal relationships. With the exception of
communicable diseases, sweethearts need disclose little else to one
another as a matter of law. Moreover, even highly informed people
don't believe the statistically likely event will ever happen to them,
especially in matters of the heart. As Lynn Baker's study on di
vorce denial among the newly married demonstrates, love means
never having to work percentages.s4 Thus, despite recently touted
consensual relation contracts, mandatory disclosure requirements
seem off the mark as a way of redressing institutional power imbal
ances between lovers.ss For now it is enough to consider the retali
atory employment cases as reminders that the course of true
amorous relations never did run smooth. Indeed, they often go off
course in ways that, if known beforehand, might sound a gentle
alarm.

53. See Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that Title VII
protection "ought not be withdrawn merely upon a showing that the victim of [the present]
harassment had in the past entered into a consensual sexual relationship with the
perpetrator").
54. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relation Is Above Average, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (presenting study suggesting young adults have undue opti
mism about the chances they will end up divorced, thus leading them to ignore divorce stat
utes and the like until they encounter marital problems).
55. See, e.g., Kuntz, supra note 33.
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v.

The failure to think about consent as an informed decision is
one gap in Gallop's account. Another missing piece of her story
has to do with the relation between the erotics of pedagogy and the
possibility of harm to students. In this section I want to sketch in
that missing material and explore the downsides not of frisson itself,
but of frisson mise en action.
During my first year of teaching, I remember working through
some seemingly impossible, self-contradictory U.C.C. section on my
syllabus for the next day. I took my diligent little diagrams and
cross-referenced Code to a more senior professor to see if he
agreed with my analysis. Looking over my arsenal of material, he
smiled and said, "The chart is fine. But some advice? Relax. Re
member, whatever you are teaching, they are thinking about sex."
My colleague didn't mean sex with me, he meant just sex. Victorian
scholar James Kincaid similarly observes that "eroticism is the air
we breathe" and in that regard classrooms are really not so very
different from everyplace else.56
Even if one doesn't accept that the earth's atmosphere is eroti
cally charged, there are still reasons why people in proximity to one
another tend to become involved. As Gallop points out, teachers
and students connect up with one another for the "usual range of
reasons why people make contact: loneliness, sympathy, re
bounding from a recently failed relationship, and, of course, admi
ration" (p. 49). There is also the luck of true love, which can strike
anyone at any time.
But none of these nothing-special-about-the-academy accounts
of teacher-student relationships seems complete. Classrooms are
different from, say, supermarkets or subway trains. (Although I see
Kincaid's point: suddenly everything is looking erotic.) There is
something about the academy and its relation to relationships that
commands greater investigation. We could start with the physical
surroundings. Kincaid points out that "as Judy Blume has shown
and as every boy and girl in the sixth grade knows, blackboards are
the most pornographically arousing things there are. Just go to one
at age twelve to work a math problem and see what happens zing! "57 But it is less the equipment than the milieu and method of
56. See James R.Kincaid, Eroticism ls a Two·way Street, and I'm Working Both Sides, in
THE EROTICS OF INSTRUCTION, supra note 5, at 81, 88, 92.
57. Id. at 89. Kincaid's argument is somewhat more developed. He observes that one
finds many things in schools: "Classroom eroticism is certain to be there, sure, just like anxi·
ety, fear, repulsion, boredom, and even curiosity, affection, and good-will. To isolate it, how
ever, as this volume has tried to do, is foolish, futile, and foul." Id. at 93. The reason it is
foul, Kincaid explains, is because:
it draws attention away from issues that matter. . . . [W]e are being skinned alive by
right-wing anti-intellectuals now in power: virtually all our values and best procedures
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the classroom that set the stage for erotic interaction, at least when
one is beyond middle school. Why are teachers and students drawn
to one another for reasons connected with the educational process?
In framing the inquiry this way, I weed out from our considera
tion two explanations for student-teacher sex still offered with vary
ing degrees of respectability. The first is that sex or romance with
students is something like a job perk. Fictional examples will do.
Consider the hero of Anne Bernays's Professor Romeo, Jake ·
Barker, who has been sleeping with students for decades. "Let's
begin with what happens when you walk into a classroom," says
Barker's therapist, rather too late in Barker's career to be of much
help. "What do you see?" "Pussy. Acres of pussy sitting there like
daisies in a garden."58 The second explanation is that sleeping with
students is a humanitarian act. John Updike captures this in Memo
ries of the Ford Administration, in which he recounts that "[i]n the
Sixties, indeed, gentle and knowing defloration had been under
stood by some of the younger, less married faculty gallants as an
extracurricular service they were being salaried to perform."59 It is
worth noting that botb. of these explanations - quantity and com
munity service - fall within the realm of consensual, and therefore
non-harassing, relationships. I note as well that the 1960s are not
dead. In a 1993 Harper's Magazine "Forum on New Rules About
Sex on Campus," Professor William Kerrigan explained with a very
straight face that:
[T]here is a kind of student I've come across in my career who was
working through something that only a professor could help her with.
I'm talking about a female student who, for one reason or another,
has unnaturally prolonged her virginity. Maybe there's a strong fa
ther, maybe there's a religious background. And if she loses that vir
ginity with a man who is not a teacher, she's going to marry that man,
boom. And I don't think that marriage is going to be very good.

are in jeopardy: theory, multi-culturalism, research itself, government support for the
arts and humanities, experimental work, gender studies, queer studies, university
presses, journals, small colleges, large universities, new jobs, any jobs, and intellectual
freedom. . . .
In such a climate and in such a world . . . waving a banner that proclaims "Stamp Out
Classroom Sex," or "Classroom Sex Now!" as if this were an issue either way, as if it
mattered . . . [is silly].
Id. at 93.
58. ANNE BERNAYS, PROFESSOR ROMEO 212 (1989).
59. JoHN UPDIKE, MEMORIES OF THE FoRD ADMINISTRATION 62 (1992). Edward Albee
offers a variation on the theme in Who's Afraid ofVirginia Woolf in the relationship between
Martha, the college president's daughter and Nick, the new math hire. See EDWARD ALBEE,
WHo's AFRAID OF VIRGINIA Woou: (1962).
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There have been times when this virginity has been presented to
me as something that I, not quite another man, half an authority fig
ure, can handle - a thing whose preciousness I realize.60

Yeah, yeah.
Yet there are explanations more connected to pedagogy than to
opportunism. Joint intellectual discovery is both thrilling and catch
ing. There is also the comfort of being in the same field or profes
sion. Many professors have chosen the pleasures of reading (and
shopping), trying out ideas (and doing dishes), editing (and climb
ing into bed) with another academic. And to some extent, students
are academics - as we want the best of them to be - if in cadet
status, a designation which is only temporary and therefore at times
seems quite artificial. Why then the fuss at what might be charac
terized as nothing more wily or pernicious than premature
graduation?
It may help to look at the question from the cadet side of things.
That is, putting aside why we are drawn to them, why are some of
them drawn to some of us? Surely the process of teaching has
something to do with it. Professor John Glavin provides a job de
scription unlike most advertised in the Chronicle of Higher

Education:
Society licenses the teacher to do what virtually no other adult in the
real world can. He or she stands up several times a week for fifty,
seventy-five, ninety minutes to exhibit with unconditional authority
the self. This is not the self enveloped in a role or in a part, not wear
ing a uniform or enclosed by a vestment, and certainly not playing by
any sort of rules. The teacher is there simply and obviously to impro
vise the self, and to carry off that self-improvisation without inhibition
until the class comes, by the teacher's consent, to an end. (Isn't that
why so many of us prolong class just that extra minute after the pe
riod officially ends, to confirm exactly how much our narcissism con
trols this particular site of exhibition?) The successful teacher . . .
enjoys - needs, also - more than anything else that sheer power to
exhibit the self untrammeled that insists that everything s/he thinks
and feels and knows ought to be interesting and relevant to everyone
who listens. And that enjoyment guarantees in tum the student's
enchantment.61

If one factors age differences, the institutional power of the profes
sor - the command of subject, the podium, the tie - the phenom60. New Rules Colloquy, supra note 32, at 35-36; but see Trudy 'fynan, U Mass Faculty
Frowns on Profs Views of Sex with Students, AP, Sept. 25, 1993, available in 1993 WL
4559690 (Faculty senate votes to "emphatically dissociate itself' from Kerrigan's statements).
61. John Glavin, The Intimacies of Instruction, in THE EROTICS OF lNSTRUCiloN, supra
note 5, at 12, 16-17. Glavin argues that the narcissism of the classroom has been fed in recent
times by the demands of a generation raised on Sesame Street: "Hostility has now become
the adolescent badge of authenticity; indifference, the cool response. Take me, try to take me
. . . challenge all but the nerds. Charm my resistance. Captivate my indifference. Please me,
entertain me, divert me, fascinate me, thrill me - seduce!" Id. at 12.
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enon of transference plus the thrill of it all, it may be a very small
move from enchantment to desire.
But what is the desire about? Why do so many students, tradi
tionally women students, fall for their teachers? Regina Barreca
proposes an answer that may sound uncomfortably familiar to
women academics:
Those of us who fell for the professor cast ourselves as Cinderella
intellectuals, waiting for the phrase
rather than the slipper - that
fit us perfectly. We waited, at fourteen, at nineteen, at twenty-five or
even thirty-five, for the figure who would see what was hidden and
special and glorious in us, who would love us for our smart selves
alone and not our yellow [or brown] hair - or so we thought . . . 62
-

.

Girls waited because smartness, insight, and brilliance are not the
qualities for which they have been traditionally rewarded. There is
now a huge literature on why (popularity) and when (adolescence)
girls stop raising their hands in class. Being chosen for "one's smart
self alone" - and by the teacher
can be thrilling indeed.
-

Yet Barreca's quote reveals the tricky part of such recognition,
for sometimes more than just a phrase is offered, praise for the stu
dent's "fine mind" serving as catalyst (or bait) for what follows.
And how do students respond to the larger invitation? Some pre
tend the advance or kiss didn't happen or, if it did, that it is some
thing one manages:
[H]e was so innocent of his own vibes, so apparently married, and so
earnestly solicitous about my graduate work, that I think my assess
ment at the time was correct: he had a mild crush on me, at least
partly because he did like my mind, and it was up to me, at twenty
one, as it had been at fourteen when my eye doctor kissed me, to
handle my confusion as best I could (assuming that he, the grown
man, could not handle his).63

Other students, as Robin West and Jane Gallop discuss, become
involved. West explains a structural piece of the dynamic:
A good male student will often attach himself to a brilliant professor,
and will aspire to be like him. A smart female student . . . might at
tach herself in this way . . . . But it's not very likely. Unlike the male
student, she is far more likely to be attracted to the brilliant professor,
and aspire not to be like him, but to give herself to him .64

West argues that because women are deeply acculturated to be
come "giving selves," an identity that includes giving or consenting
to sex, "the definition of 'self' as a sexually giving self rather than
62. Barreca, supra note 9, at 2.
63. Myra Goldberg, But I Thought He Liked My Paper, in THE EROTICS OF lNsrnuc
TION, supra note 5, at 166, 167. Goldberg notes that she later rejected this man's offer of help
in her career, "something I could have used." Id.
64. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 81, 109 (1987).
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an academically demanding self is always there, always in competi
tion [with the intellectual self], always available."65 Here preposi
tions become crucial. Sleeping with the great man - giving one's
self to him - ends the woman's internal war by reconciling the two
selves; chosen for her mind, she also gets to give herself sexually.
The high is undeniable: "It feels palpably meaningful to enrich the
life of someone who is admirable and immersed in a discipline you
value by merely being, and by giving what you are."66 The result,
West insists, is a "deeper tragedy, a more profound loss, and a
greater harm" than the student who trades sex for an A.67 That
student at least moves on with her life. In contrast, the student
member of "the fully consensual and highly regarded romantic at
tachments of female graduate students and assistant professors"
often gives up her own intellectual project in order to enrich his life
- or semester.68
Gallop describes an almost identical terrain. In the 1970s,
French departments "were full of female students, the faculty was
predominately male, the powerful professors were nearly all male,
and ·it was the male graduate students who were treated and took
themselves to be 'professional,' who were being groomed to take
the place of the faculty."69 Like West, she too understood that
sleeping with professors was meaningful. The difference, however,
is that Gallop was keen to take from her two naked professors; any
giving on her part was incidental. Sleeping with them "seemed to
make it somewhat easier for me to write" (p. 42). Perhaps most
important, "I felt that in their eyes I was both a desirable woman
and a serious scholar" (p. 43).
This last claim oddly narrows the gap between Gallop's invigo
rated graduate student and West's disempowered one. Both are at
least momentarily rewarded by combining sex with intellect as a
result of professorial sex. But, we might ask, borrowing from James
Thurber, is sex (still) necessary? As we approach the millennium,
might not a bright woman student find confidence and satisfaction
without going through this tired and risky - win or lose, on West's
account - academic rite of passage? Barreca puts the question this
way: "At what point . . . did the moment come for each of us when
we realized that we wanted to be the teacher, and not sleep with the
teacher?"70 Using a range of wonderful literary examples by
women authors, she points out how unnecessary, time-consuming,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 109.
Id.
GALLOP, THINKING THROUGH THE BooY, supra note 3, at 42.
Barreca, supra note 9, at 2.
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and comical the detour can be. In George Eliot's Middlemarch, for
example, poor Dorothea Brooke imagines that "the really delight
ful sort of marriage must be that where your husband was a sort of
father, and could teach you Hebrew if you wished it" and ends up
with the learned, desiccated Casaubon.71 Barreca observes that
"Dorothea makes the mistake that colors all feminine affection for
the teacher/lover: confusing scholarship with kissing a scholar."72
But what is so bad about kissing - or, a la Gallop, bagging the scholar? What exactly is the harm? I suggest there is a cata
logue of options to chose from. A subtle and disturbing form of
harm is West's suggestion that graduate students who get the pro
fessor end up wasting their talents and abandoning their own work
in order to serve the great man. Second, in cases where the student
wins, then loses the professor, there is the possibility of professional
retaliation. Third, because professor and student lover are not
alone in the academy, there are often the practical consequences of
public exposure. Consider former student-girlfriend Leslie Irvine's
experience:
For a long time, I went around feeling naive, humiliated, and
ashamed. Many of his colleagues knew the extent of the errands I ran
for him. . . . Many of his colleagues were also my professors, and the
humiliation I felt in their presence was great. I was ridiculed by stu
dents who were aware of what was going on. My emotional attach
ment to him earned me the title "Professor X's pitbull," as though I
could not think for myself, only defend my master on command.73

Finally, to the extent teacher-student relationships result from
the phenomenon of transference (the projection of qualities belong
ing to an important person from the student's past onto the thera
pist), the student may feel betrayed when the teacher, like the
therapist, violates the rules of the role. The betrayal comes when
the therapist uses information or trust gained in a professional ca
pacity not to help the patient understand those earlier relationships,
but for the therapist's personal advantage with the patient. Gallop
cheerfully accepts that transference is "a nearly universal response
to people whose opinions of us have great authority, in particular
doctors and teachers" (p. 56). But here Gallop's analysis becomes
remarkably unaware. She characterizes transference itself as "un
doubtedly an 'amorous relation"' (p. 56). We love our parents; we
project that love onto whoever is standing at the front of the room.
And that is about it for Gallop's transference discussion. But this
dip into psychoanalytic theory stops somewhere short of its usual
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Leslie Irvine, A "Consensual" Relationship, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT
234, 242 (Bernice Sandler & Robert Shoop eds., 1997).
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end. While transference may be an "inevitable part of any relation
ship [a student] has to a teacher who really makes a difference" (p.
56), it is not supposed to operate as a dating service. Therapists and
teachers who know what they are doing must do more than recog
nize the basic phenomenon. They must also have an appreciation
of counter-transference, the projection of their own emotional
resonances back onto the patient-student and think twice before
giving in to the desire to put student adoration to personal use.
The notion of restraint in the context of teaching is disarmingly
discussed by Michele Barale in an essay focusing on the problems
of erotic pedagogy particularly for gay and lesbian teachers. Barale
notes that the gay or lesbian teacher
can become the perfect symbol for a variety of meanings. We may
represent all the possibilities of rebellious sexuality . . . [the] sites for
the expression of both their liberalism and their bigotry . . . certainly
we are the dramatis personae of private dramas enacting the fears and
thrills of sexual identity; and god knows that we play out parental
roles we can't begin to fathom, were we even to want to.74

Because the professor may feel alienated from his or her depart
ment and may also share with students a more general sense of ex
clusion from the dominant culture, "it can become all too tempting
to enter not only our students' intellectual lives but also their
beds."75 But Barale stays out of student beds exactly to preserve
the pedagogical use of the classroom's erotic charge. Her explana
tion seems right for professors across the board:
Since neither the material of the classroom nor pedagogy itself ever
can or should be made off-limits for erotic pleasure, the students must
be. The boundary that separates our sexual desire from that of our
students has to be intentionally established to allow no negotiation
. . . . [Otherwise] it will be only too easy to use the classroom as a way
to feel good about ourselves. . . . As long as we are unconscious of this
internal conflict, it is not difficult to manipulate the continuance of an
infatuation even while giving it the lip service of denial.76

Law professors may have less problem with the erotics of our
materials, but an eroticized moment in class or the professor as ped
agogical object of desire is not unfamiliar. And what to do? Barale
suggests recognizing the value of boundaries, not as a means of
stamping out desire, but rather to let students know what they can
have and can expect from their teachers.77 I take this to mean that
74. Michele Aina Barale, The Romance of Class and Queers: Academic Erotic Zones, in
TILTING THE TOWER 16, 18-19 (Linda Garber ed., 1994).
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 22.
let's
77. "I am not saying, 'no red cowboy boots or muscle Ts or leather mini-skirts
make the world safe for tweed again."' Id. at 23. An example of this may be the policy of
one colleague who refuses to date students even after they have graduated so that his current
students have the security of knowing they are not being set up for a later hit. This is an
.

.

•
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students may rightfully expect quite a lot from our intellectual lives
and efforts. The project is hardly hermetic: "Intensely engaged by
what we do, we necessarily become intensely engaged with those
who do it with us."78 The difference between kinds of intense en
gagement is not primarily one of degree, but rather of self
awareness; amorous relations are the ones that "feel[ ] better than
[they] teach[ ]."79
VI.

What are the implications of all this for policies? I agree with
Gallop that consensual sexual relations between professors and stu
dents are not by themselves sexual harassment. They may be many
other things: unwise, foolhardy, misguided, unnecessary and per
haps at times irresistible. But characterizing consensual relations as
harassment in the first instance is too assured a move. One must at
least puzzle through the question of whether student consent - es
pecially law student consent - can be valid even when taken under
circumstances of institutional constraint.
And here, with regard to the politics of consensual relations pol
icies, Gallop's insights momentarily take a less feverish tone. She
reviews the tensions between "victim feminism" and "power femi
nism." Those in the "victim" camp think young women still benefit
from policies - anti-pornography ordinances, prohibitions of con
sensual relations - that those in the "power" camp regard as un
necessary protectionism. The power/victim labels are silly but the
debate is not. Both groups are trying to figure out how to prevent
continued disadvantage for women on the basis of sex. In my view,
adherents simply locate themselves at different points on the Not
There Yet Continuum. Not surprisingly, Gallop, who has taken her
fair share of prisoners, admits a preference for "something like
'power feminism"' (p. 71). Yet she admits that it is troubling indeed
"to see that this new nineties 'power feminism' frequently talks as if
the worst enemies of women were other feminists, the wrong sort of
feminists . . . . History and theory together suggest that we think
about whose interests it serves when feminists are at each other's
throats" (pp. 71-72).
In addition, including consensual relations within harassment
policies may well distract attention from the kinds of quid pro quo
interesting, self-imposed version of the Victorian-era restriction that disallowed widowers
from marrying their deceased wife's sister in order to maintain household integrity ("to at
least interrupt daydreaming") during the wife's life in a period when unmarried sisters not
uncommonly lived with the married ones. See Margaret Mead, Anomalies in American
Postdivorce Relationships, in DIVORCE AND AFTER 107, 118 (Paul Bohannon ed., Anchor
Books 1971) (1970).
78. Barale, supra note 74, at 17.
79. Id.
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cases about which there is no dispute and which have long plagued
the educations and careers of women students. One sees a pro
nounced, almost delighted, tendency in public discourse to seize
marginal or eccentric applications of harassment policy - the kin
dergarten kisser, for example - to demonstrate once and for all
how foolish and repressive the whole project really is. There is a
particular risk for feminists in all of this. Where consensual, nonsu
pervisory relationships are understood as harassment, the already
prevalent male-fantasy fear that looking at a woman cross-eyed will
cost you your career is intensified. David Mamet's play Oleanna
got this bit of anxiety right.80 This, in tum, is chalked up to feminist
faculty who, as everyone knows, want to stamp out all sex for every
one forever in order to demonstrate their tremendous power within
their institutions.s1
But although consensual relationships may not be harassment,
they may still constitute a category of behavior about which aca
demic institutions are properly concerned. Even if we assume per
fect consent in every case, there is still the matter of conflict of
interest during the relationship and the possibility of retaliation af
terwards. There is still a reasonable concern about the appearance
of favoritism in the eyes of those students not attractive or attracted
to their professors.82 In this regard, consensual relations policies
simply extend familiar rules against nepotism or fraternization.83
80. See DAVID MAMET, 0LEANNA (1992).
81. Professor Kerrigan: "The 'paradigm' is a generation of academic feminists who push
this legislation because in an era where a leer constitutes rape, they believe they are powerful
enough to punish womanizing male colleagues." New Rules Colloquy, supra note 32, at 38.
82. Here too the law of sexual harassment fails would-be plaintiffs. Paramour suits
brought by third parties, those employees who were not promoted when the boss's sweet
heart was, are generally unsuccessful along much the same lines as the "after the dance is
over" cases. As with retaliation, favoritism based on personal relationships between supervi
sor and employee is not considered discrimination based on sex. The EEOC Guidance on
Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism states:
Not all types of sexual favoritism violate Title VII. It is the Commission's position that
Title VII does not prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon con
sensual romantic relationships. An isolated instance of favoritism toward a "paramour"
(or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or
men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders.
EEOC: Policy Guide on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism Under Title VII, 8 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA), No. 694, at 405: 6817 (Jan. 12, 1990), quoted in O'Patka v. Menasha Corp.,
878 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. WIS. 1995); see also Ayers v. American Tel. and Tel., 826 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (discussing favoritism in the context of age discrimination).
83. This is the rationale followed by the University of Michigan:
The University's nepotism policy precludes any professional staff member from evaluat
ing the work or academic performance of others with whom they have intimate familial
or close personal relationships. Thus, consensual romantic or sexual relationships be
tween faculty/staff and students also require disclosure to the appropriate administrative
supervisor so that arrangements can be made for objective evaluation and decision
making with regard to the student.
Policy of University of Michigan, excerpted in Memorandum from Northwestern Provost
(n.d.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Northwestern Memo].
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There is also the general matter of women and the atmosphere
of education. It would be nice to think that girls could just attend
school. I do not mean "school" as a euphemism for "convent."
College and graduate study present students with sexual opportuni
ties and temptations in all sorts of new forms and quantities; figur
ing out how to deal with them is part of what one gets gratis with
the degree. At the same time, however, there is something hearten
ing in an institution where students would not have to consider
themselves sexually available to everyone - especially those whose
duty is to teach, even if they teach in classrooms where the peda
gogical voltage is high.
It is here, in fixing the default rule for consensual relations, that
Gallop and I part company. While she admits that personal rela
tions with students can sometimes be "intense, complicated, and
sticky" (p. 53), she places the risk of stickiness on the student. That
is accomplished by having no rule at all. The university is like any
other place (except the family, the military, and many businesses)
where parties are left to sort out their relationships by themselves.
In contrast, a number of colleges and universities have enacted
policies that place the risk of messy aftermath on the professor.
Most focus only on relationships in which the professor retains a
supervisory role with regard to the student.84 Under this regime
consensual relationships are permitted but clearly discouraged. The
mechanism of discouragement is burden shifting. New York Uni
versity Law School, for example, creates a presumption that sexual
relations between persons of disparate institutional power are not

84. See Administratiave Procedures for the Nepotism and Consensual Sexual or Roman
tic Relationships Policy, University of Minnesota (n.d.) (on file with author) ("Members of
the University communitiy who are.in personal relationships with each other and are likely to
be placed in a position to . . . supervise . . . grade or advise, or otherwise directly influence the
academic progress or employment of the other person in the relationship, must consult with
an appropriate administrator to seek guidance about eliminating and avoiding existing and
potential conflicts arising from the relationship") (emphasis added); Office of Equal Oppor
tunity, Tufts University, Tufts Policy on Consensual Relationships (visited June 23, 1998)
<http://www.tufts.edu/oeo/consent.htm> ("Voluntary consent by the student in such a rela
tionship (between faculty members or academic administrators and students] is suspect, given
the fundamental nature of the relationship."); see also Jeff Leeds, U. Va. Faculty Passes Stu
dent-Teacher Sex Ban, VIRGINIAN PILOT AND LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Apr. 23, 1993, at
Al, available in 1993 WL 8440087 ("(t]he policy . . . would forbid professosrs and graduate
teaching assistants from amorous or sexual relationships or overtures involving students
whom they teach, coach, evaluate or to whom they allocate money."). The AALS Statement
of Good Practices goes further, stating that "Even when a professor has no professional re
sponsibility for a student, the professor should be sensitive to the perceptions of other stu
dents that a student who has a sexual relationship with a professor may receive preferential
treatment from the professor or the professor's colleagues." AALS Executive Committee,
Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Profes
sional Responsibilities (Nov. 17, 1989), reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, 1995 HANDBOOK 89, 91 (1995).
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automatically consensual.85 If the relationship is challenged, the
professor must then demonstrate the voluntariness of the student's
consent. And the burden of doing so is clearly his: the policies
refer to "ostensibly"86 or "apparently"87 consensual relationships
and consent is "suspect."88 Of course, when everyone lives happily
ever after - whether together or apart - burdens of proof will
never arise. When they do not, "it is almost always the case that the
individual with the power or status advantage will bear the burden
of accountability."89
Putting the burden on the party in greater control of the trans
action is a familiar method of allocating risk. The professor is
surely better able to protect himself against the consequences of
involvement: he has superior information; he knows how the insti
tution works; he may be a repeat player or at least will have heard
the war stories of others. The professor may also be the one with
more at risk. In a personal sense, there is perhaps vanity; institu
tionally, there may be something more, although many policies are
silent with regard to penalty.
A few other schools, most recently Yale, rely not on the frailties
of consent but on the impact of consensual relations for others.90
Because the focus here is on favoritism and not consent, the rela
tions are prohibited outright. This makes sense as even hugely con
sensual relationships still "jeopardize[ ] the integrity of the
educational process by creating a conflict of interest and may lead
to an inhospitable learning environment for other students."91
The articulation of institutional rationale for consensual rela
tions policies is important. Rules that burden consent may have the
effect of closing down consensual relations but do so by indirection.
I prefer the candor of the prohibition, based not on the student's
inability to fall in love but on the consequences of doing so for ever
yone else. Policies based on academic atmosphere situate faculty
student romances in broader and relevant context. The parties con
nection may be consensual but it is not wholly private. Rules that
85. See Sylvia Law, Good Intentions Are Not Enough: An Agenda for Law School Deans,
77 lowA L. REv. 79, 85 {1991).
86. Policy of University of Florida excerpted in Northwestern Memo, supra note 83.
87. Policy of University of Maryland, excerpted in Northwestern Memo, supra note 83.
88. Policies of Tufts and Indiana University, quoted in New Rules Colloquy, supra note
32, at 36.
89. Policy of University of WISconsin-Madison, excerpted in Northwestern Memo, supra
note 83.
90. See Yale Bans Sex Between Students and Faculty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1997, at BS.
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Stanford University phrases it somewhat dif
ferently and notes that consensual relationships "may underniine the real or perceived integ
rity of [faculty] supervision . . . particularly the trust inherent in the student-faculty
relationship." Policy of Stanford University, quoted in New Rules Colloquy, supra note 32, at
36.
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insist on supervisory neutrality - what we might call professional
ism - do not thwart desire or deny agency, at least for longer than
a law school semester.92
There are, of course, certain problems with any rule. Whether a
ban or a frown, the policy may go unenforced or may be enforced
unevenly - with enforcement perhaps more often directed at
same-sex student-faculty couples.93 And as I have suggested, poli
cies against student-faculty relationships fail to account for the
spontaneous nature of much romance. Still, what is lost with a pol
icy that requires a professor not to pursue or accept involvement
with students while he is in a supervisory capacity? Counting the
days until the semester's end might be seen as today's version of the
nineteenth-century Grand Tour forced upon young lovers as a test
of their commitment to one another.94 The burden is especially
manageable in law schools, where long-term relationships with our
students are relatively rare. Some argue that such a rule is just fine
in metropolitan areas where professors can hang out at Barnes and
Noble coffee counters all over town to meet like-minded strangers,
but it is another story in college towns where unmarried professors
necessarily count on the periodic arrival of new graduate students.
This may well be a recruitment issue on some campuses. More seri
ous may be the reported reluctance of professors to mentor gradu
ate students with the care and enthusiasm once embraced in that
relationship. Male partners in some law firms have expressed hesi
tation in taking on junior women associates for fear of overstepping
some invisible line of impermissible contact.95 Gallop warns that
consensual relations policies will produce a similar dynamic of with
drawal in the academy. Not just mentoring but engaged, stimulat
ing, hot teaching itself will eventually fade away.
I'm not so sure. Janet Malcolm is convinced that "the new re
pression can only spur the irrepressible Gallop to new audacities."96
92. I recognize that such prohibitions are less problematic in law schools where we rarely
have sustained supervisory authority over any one student. In contrast, graduate students
typically work under a small number of professors for a period of years. This intensifies the
problem from both directions: the dissertation advisor has substantially more power over her
non-anonymous student and banning the relationship has greater long-term cost to the
participants.
93. See Naragon v. Wharton, 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984) (lesbian professor fired after
suit against college by parents of a student with whom professor was involved; a similar
relationship between a heterosexual professor and a student had gone unchallenged and
unpunished).
94. Certainly the law does not regard postponement as legally irreparable in the case of
minors who want to marry but without parental consent must wait until the age of majority.
See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd., 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982).
95. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
306, 376 (1995) (reporting some male partners in large firms avoid contact with women attor
neys for fear of being accused of sexism).
96. Malcolm, supra note 2, at 9.
·
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Audacity may be beyond the reach or aspiration of most of us; yet I
accept a calmer version of Gallop's premise. Who can deny the
thrill of that moment in class where, as she wonderfully puts it, one
feels "the buzz of live knowledge" and "learning begins to dance"
(p. 20)? At such moments, Gallop explains and we understand that
"my students love me and I'm crazy for them" (p. 20). This is a
moment most of us recognize, appreciate, seek. Still, one can be
joyously crazy for one's students and still not sleep with them.
We might look to Plato's Symposium for precedent. There
beautiful, bad Alcibiades tells his chums about his mad crush on
Socrates:
And speaking for myself, gentlemen, if I wasn't afraid you'd tell me I
was completely bottled, I'd swear on oath what an extraordinary ef
fect his words have had on me - and still do, if it comes to that. For
the moment I hear him speak I am smitten with a kind of sacred rage
. . . and my heart jumps into my mouth and the tears start into my
eyes . . . . 97

Alcibiades reports on his diligent efforts to seduce Socrates: invit
ing him to dinner, bumping into him around town, wrestling with
him in the gym - "thinking that something was bound to happen
there."98 He finally gets Socrates alone on a trip and realizing it is
now or never, "wrapped my own cloak round him - for this was in
the winter - and, creeping under his shabby old mantle, I took him
in my arms and lay there all night with this godlike and extraordi
nary man."99 But as Alcibiades reports the next morning:
[W]hen I got up . . . I had no more slept with Socrates, within the
meaning of the act, than if he'd been my father or an elder brother.
You can guess what I felt like after that. I was tom between my
natural humiliation and my admiration for his manliness and self
control.1 00

The extraordinary effect of a teacher's words; mutual admiration; ·
self-control. The Socratic Method?
Almost. This slice of the Symposium misses the sexual relation
ships between Athenian teachers and their students that were regu
larly included within pedagogical pursuits of beauty. It is then
perhaps the Platonic form of Socrates we should keep before us.
Or maybe conflict analysis is enough. Not the standard concern
regarding how we treat the student we adore and how we treat the
rest of the class. I mean instead the conflict between two internal
97. PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES 567 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds.,
1961).
98. Id. at 568. Compare Gallop's campaign against her two professors: "Trying not to be
too obnoxious, I watched for opportunities that might present themselves, prepared to take
advantage and press my suit." P. 41.
99. PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 99, at 570.
100. Id.
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sources of professorial pleasure: the erotics of intellectual exchange
and the separate charge of the long kiss. The two strands are not
always easy to keep apart. When exactly does physical desire slip
the pedagogical bonds from which (we at least pretend) it arose?
Who knows? The exact moment matters less than the general
awareness that the personal and the professional are distinct cate
gories. The spheres overlap - and much is owed to feminism for
insisting on this. But feminists have never claimed an identity of
interest between the two. Gallop's enthusiasm for complete merger
makes for snazzy reading. But it also makes for sloppy theorizing
and reckless practices.

